2019 IR Honors Conference

2019 IR Honors Conference


So I say, good morning everyone, thank you
for coming to my I.R. honors thesis presentation, let’s begin. Take a close
look at this picture what is this highly decorated, World War one, German General
doing in China in 1934?These troops here must be German, or are they Chinese?
How did Chiang Kai-shek’s son become a decorated wehrmacht tank commander?Between
1914 and 1945, practically every able-bodied German man he wore the
uniform, but what happened to them in the interim? The career opportunities for
ambitious officers lay elsewhere and that’s why many famous names appear, of
all places, in China. The first half of the last century, the Germans were the
management consultants board if you had a naval war, monetary problem you called the
Brits, but if you wanted to build a modern army from the ground up, you called the
Germans. Men like Max Bauer, Hans von Seeckt, Alexander von Falkenhausen were simply the best in the business with a mandate from the highest
levels of the Chinese and the German governments. Their job was to accomplish
the unlikely, the creation of the first truly national Chinese army. This is an
odd couple for sure, German officers in nationalist China, and, culturally, this
arrangement doesn’t seem to make a lot of sense.
My thesis argues they might have succeeded in surprising ways. Before I set out to find the answer, I structured my inquiry around these three broad
research questions: Why do nations choose to cooperate? When they choose to
conflict? How and why the post-colonial relationships
change? Why did China choose Germany as her mentor? And, to what extent, did the
Germans modernize and reform the Chinese army? And why did the
relationship end? My first research question was partially what prompted my
interest in the area, China cooperated with the USSR for much of the 1950s.
When [my] Mom was growing up in Beijing, however, she had to do duck and
cover drills under her desk. Not because they were afraid of American ICBMs, [it was] because of
Soviet ones. In the 1970s, China’s 10-year honeymoon with the USSR become a bitter
hatred, I began to wonder why nations cooperate, why they stopped cooperating. So
I turn to an earlier period in Chinese history to help to understand the
forgotten German role in China’s organization. Through research I secured U.A.R. funding to scour archives in Germany for original documents like there policy
memorandum on China. I’ve also examined secondary literature in English, German,
and Chinese to see whether- in German- Chinese. Scholarly voices are hotly divided on
whether the Germans really made any difference at all, some say the
corruption and incompetence of the nationalist Chinese military leadership
diluted the German military reform others say the Germans contributed
sorely needed expertise and hardware at a crucial time for national
consolidation, I leaned towards the latter view and I’ll outlined my reasons why.
But that doesn’t mean the literature itself is perfect, the biggest problem, I
discovered, is that there is almost nothing written in English about my area
of study, my thesis is determined to change that, I taught myself German so I can
understand the German advisors in their own words, poring over policy memoranda
letters and photographs in these three archives has given me a rich insight
into the war. Still, the current secondary literature does a pretty poor job of
telling us who the German advisors really were. Through painstaking primary
research, I hope to put faces with names again. For, without names there can be no
historical agency. The average German military advisor would have been a
middle-aged field grade officer was a decorated veteran of WWI 1 with
right-wing political leanings. Despite being adverse to the Nazis, the
officers were well educated in the finest practitioners of their military
art. Their motives for being in China were diverse, but they all
believed that they were certainly interested in German foreign policy in the
far East, I did dig through German military archive, find these photos and particularly,
because their activity in China was officially secret. I crunched the data
that discovered some things about the composition of the military mission, the
first thing we noticed is a heavy representation of middle and high
ranking officers, including ten generals the Germans also bundled a number of
civilian advisors and foreign specialists into their advisor
mission. And here, I’ve broken down the German military personnel by their
branch specialization, and we can see immediately an overwhelming
representation, infantry in the green, which naturally reflects Germany’s and
China’s status as land powers. To consolidate his personal rule, Chinese leader Chiang
Kai-shek tasked his German advisors with building him a modern China.
By the mid-1930s German capital was funding the infrastructure built by
German firms to make Chiang kai-shek powerful and himself rich. As part of the
strategic partnership, German industrial firms gained access to China’s
inexhaustible rare earths like tungsten for armor-piercing shells the Germans
used legal loopholes and shell companies to secretly funnel the latest weaponry to
China. Soon, German rifles, machine guns, flat cannons, and even tanks can be seen
on Chinese streets. War was big business and the Germans found
China to be one of the best foreign customers in their history. With investments to protect, it soon became in Germany’s political interests build up a
strong China as a counterweight to Soviet Union. [inaudible]
relationship was not simply transaction, both countries were outcasts in the
international system, both countries felt wronged by foreign powers. The Chinese
can rest assured that the Germans had no further colonial designs upon them,
unlike the Americans and the British and I found this unlikely marriage of
convenience was, at least for its time, a remarkably equitable one between a
European and a non European power. Slow, but surely, the Germans started
molding the Chinese into their own image, and the sense of cooperation
extended even further into philosophical. A broad unity of philosophical purpose
enabled the Germans to make a disproportionate impact in China, the
Germans and the Chinese both heavily emphasized the role of a well-educated
officer corps to lead party, army, and nation. Chinese students were invited
back to Germany to learn everything from chemistry, to governance, to engineering.
For many years, nobody could really be sure what the Germans actually thought
about the Chinese advisees, but I discovered this 1939 after-action report in the
German military archives where the Germans who had been to China recorded
their experiences, the Chinese for their part were very quick learners and I find
the statement about building a relationship of trust very telling and
interesting. [inaudible] Japanese invasion of China in 1937 forces back to one of
the central questions of my research, did German military assistance deliver any
meaningful impact? In the short term as I’ve swore several case studies, yes.
Using weapons and tactics learned from their German advisors, elite Chinese units
gave the Japanese a bloody nose at Shanghai and dashed Japanese aspirations for
a quick conquest of China. China could not decisively stop Japan in 1937 but by
employing classic German tactics such as defense in depth and strategic encirclement Chinese troops denied the victory that Japan so desperately needed.
One question we must asked is what caused such a fruitful relationship to end so abruptly.
After years of protests from Japanese diplomats, the German government ceased
trying to broker a peace between China and Japan and recalled all those advisors home to
Germany in July 1938. But I already got this break in relations was a long time
coming, it was not the rise of Nazism per se that caused a sign in German
relationship to collapse cooperation was most intense between 1933 1937
when they actually supported by a number of prominent officials in the early third reich. Rather, I think the end of cooperation was due to a combination
of factors. The proximate cause was German bureaucratic politics in spring
1938 in which [inaudible] committed pro-Japan Nazis as conservative non-Nazi and
pro-china officials within the German government. But the two long-term causes
have been bubbling under the surface for at least since 1934, Nazi racial ideology
saw the Japanese as a more suitable partner against international communism
despite the considerable economic and military interest the German stood to
lose in China. Pro-Nazi officials in the foreign ministry
we’re also convinced that Japan would be a more effective counterweight against
the USSR than China beset by internal issues. To prepare for the
future war against Soviet Russia, as the argument went, Germany’d be best served by
trading up to the strong horses in Asia. China was friendless in the world until
Pearl Harbor brought America formerly in the war against Japan. The German
advisors do not quite vanish from the pages of history, many of the Germans who
had been to China, most famously Von Falkenhausen were very actively
involved in July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler. Perhaps thier time
instructing the Chinese had reminded them of a common humanity that was
missing at home. In recent years, the [inaudible] has shifted to
allow a greater discussion of the German rule, if you go to the [inaudible] Museum
in western city of Chengdu, you can see this bus that the Chinese
government has place to honor general Von Falkenhauser, and I hope by that by
writing this thesis I can give men like him the recognition they deserve. In the
end the Germans could not save nationalist China in 1937, but nor could
the Americans in 1949, to the extent the Germans tried to recreate a Prussian
army in the Far East they did not succeed within the narrow time frame
they were granted but insofar as they created the first truly national armed
forces in Chinese history, they mustered some credit. Study of this period holds a
number of useful lessons for our own, I think.
The first thing you see is that states on the margins of the International
System often find creative ways to militarily cooperate with each other and
that’s why we see this North Korean RPG in the hands of this Iranian proxy
Shiite militiamen in northern Iraq, the second thing we learned is that
modernizing backward militaries such as today’s Afghan National Army is very
difficult for American policymakers the experience of the Germans in China
teaches us to mind the gap between expectations and reality creating
lasting military change requires deep institutional reform and not just
advanced weaponry, battlefield field competence cannot be purchased at any price, I want
to close on the human dimension because I think this is something that the
accent literature really lacks, Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Wei-kuo study at the
Munich Military Academy in the late 1930s where he was well liked and
respected by his peers. For the rest of his life he spoke German with the
Tyrolean accent, he still wrote letters to his old soldier friends in Germany in
Austria, this shows that being Chinese did not disqualify him from his circle
of alte Kameraden, old comrades. Thank you. Good morning everyone, before I get started something,
everyone, IR Honors Program, thank you to Professor Wolf for all of your support for the past
years and every year and the IR honors cohort and a huge thanks to my
supervisors as well and to all of you for coming out this morning So, today I will be presenting on my thesis : living up to responsibilities, UN humanitarian
interventions and impacts of R2P. Within the realm of international
affairs, the U.N. has played an integral role in maintaining international peace and security
amongst soverign nation since the end of the Second World War.
As stated in the UN Charter, the UN has also enshrined norms of respected state
sovereignty and non-intervention within the domestic matters of the state.
Increasingly since the end of 1945 to the contemporary era, human security has
also become an increasingly important part of global security and has necessitated actions within the human rights sphere in order to ensure peace. However,
the U.S. peacekeeping division has struggled to implement these goals,
particularly after the cold war. Specifically, peacekeeping disasters in
the 90s in conflict such as Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia pushed on the view that the UN is
unequipped to deal with these new modern conflicts. They’re not generally
intrastate or civil wars, rather than interstate. Does a debate emerged in the
90s following these peacekeeping disasters over whether the UN should
intervene and interstate conflict such as Rwanda or Srebrenica in
order to avoid violations of human rights, or whether they should uphold
traditional notions of state sovereignty and non-intervention within the domestic
buyers of the state as stated within the UN Charter. So, in response these
peacekeeping failures in the debate over sovereignty versus intervention a new
concept was created called responsibility to protect or R2P. R2P was
unanimously agreed upon by UN member states in 2005 and created a new
framework for humanitarian interventions, over all the principles or R2P can be
summed up into three main pillars the first of which is that the primary
responsibility to protect civilians from four main cases of mass atrocity:
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, lies
in the state itself. And if the state is unable to protect its people, then the
international community has a responsibility to utilize peaceful
measures such as diplomatic or economic measures in order to help the state
protect its people. And then finally, only if these two previous pillars are
inadequate, then the Security Council is now authorized to take forceful measures
including military interventions in order to protect civilians. So, over all,
R2P revives these traditional notions of state sovereignty and
non-interventionism that we see in the UN Charter and main sovereignty
contingent upon protection of civilians meaning that the UN now have greater
authority to intervene in any domestic matters of the state in order to ensure
human rights protections and overall gives the UN more authority to
intervene in intrastate conflicts rather than solely interstate conflicts. So,
overall, for my research, my main question was what effected the responsibility to
protect doctrine have on the way that the UN perform military and interventions
and has R2P truly succeeded in its mission of preventing and abating mass
atrocities? So, to answer this question, my thesis first takes a quantitative
approach through statistical analysis and then a qualitative and approach through
three case studies and our two examinees [inaudible] these effects in further detail. So a
quick road map for my presentation, first I’ll be discussing the existing
scholarly literature on this topic, then I’ll go into my research design for my
statistical analysis, followed by my quantitative findings, then I’ll discuss
my research design for my key studies, followed by my qualitative findings. and
I’ll conclude with some future challenges R2P and policy implications.
So, overall, the current scholarly literature can mainly be divided into
two separate sections: the qualitative and the quantitative.The qualitative
works mainly take a historical and empirical approach to analyzing the
normative affect of r2p, however, these works don’t really examine
how R2P has actually changed how the UN intervenes and then, on the other hand, the
quantitative works take a statistical approach to analyze UN peacekeeping more
broadly and they’re able to point to specific factors that determine UN
intervention, however none of these works examine R2P specifically and most of them
are even pre 2005. So, in order to bridge this gap, I’ll be using the qualitative
works to develop testable hypothesis that I’ll analyze through my quantitative
analysis including an effect of R2P and then I’ll examine this effect more
empirically in my three case studies. So, if you’re in research design for my
statistical analysis my unit of analysis is internal armed conflicts from the end
of the Cold War to 2017, my method of analysis is a survival time analysis
which measures time to [inaudible] in this case I’m measuring time until UN
intervention in the conflict, and then, in terms of my independent variables,
below are some of the ones I looked at but most importantly, looking at the effect of R2P on affecting UN intervention speeds. So, given that R2P gave the
Security Council greater authority to intervene in civil wars in order to
protect civilians, I’m hypothesizing that, after R2P, these intrastate
peacekeeping missions will be implemented faster because of this
enhanced authority. So, overall, after a couple different models and regressions,
I found that the only time RTP is actually statistically significant in
determining when the UN intervenes is only in conflicts with fewer than a
thousand battle deaths, so as you can see through the left hand red bubble in
these conflicts RTP actually accelerates intervention by 66%.So, overall, I
take this to mean that R2P only really has an effect in nascent conflicts
and, in these cases, R2P is used as tool for preventive interventions. So,
next for my case studies I really wanted to know more about what it’s actually
driving these interventions that we see empirically. So, to answer this question, I
used a process tracing method to analyze the presence of three different driving
variables, the first is an imminent risk of mass atrocities which brings up the [inaudible] of r2p, next is pressure from regional organizations, which is
necessary to actually push the UN to take action in the conflict, and then
finally there needs to be an interest of the Security Council p5 actually create
an intervention and this could be defined as at least one number of p5 has an
interest in intervention and none are opposing. So, for my case studies, I chose
two cases in which there was an intervention under R2P which was Libya
and Cote D’lvoire and then a third one in which there was applicability of R2P
because of the presence of mass atrocities but no intervention which was
Syria. So first for Libya in terms of mass atrocities there was a lot of
violence against protesters, astronomy, 2011 Arab Spring protests, and violence
from the Gaddafi regime against civilians. Particularly, Colonel Gaddafi
also had a direct rhetoric against suggesting violence and civilians and
possible mass atrocities there’s a lot of regional pressure garnered by the
League of Arab, states the African Union, and the GCC which we’re all pushing for
the UN to intervene in Libya and then, finally, in terms of interest in p5
the UK and France had an interest in implementing a no-fly zone in Libya in
order to create peace and security in the Mediterranean. The U.S. also reversed its
previous non-interventionist stance to support intervention for civilian
protection and Russia and China and [inaudible] from the intervention so
overall this led to resolution 1973 which was the first usage of R2P for a
humanitarian intervention and authorized all necessary measures to protect
civilians within Libya. So, next on a Cote D’lviore, there was a lot of
electoral violence surrounding the 2010 presidential elections and the incumbent
president Gbagbo’s forces had fired against protesters and there were
concerns of possible imminent mass atrocities and then, in terms of regional
pressure, the economic community of of West African states along with the African
Union were significantly pushing the UN to intervene further in the conflict. And
then, for p5 there was an inherent French interest in the country given
that Cote Dlviore is a former colony of France and they had significant ties and
there was also a previous peacekeeping mission already in the country which the
p5 had already implemented. So, overall, this led to a resolution 1975 which
authorized all necessary means to carry out a mandate to protect civilians and
also reaffirmed the responsibility of cote D’lviore to protected people. So finally
in the case of Syria. there have been clear cases of mass atrocities
surrounding the 2011 Arab Spring protests and the Assad regime’s use of force
against protesters and civilians there’s also been evidence of chemical weapons
use against civilians perpetrated by the Assad regime. However, in terms of
regional pressure, regional organizations have largely been silent on the issue,
particularly the Arab League has even moved to readmit Syria into the Arab
League and then, in terms of interest of p5, there’s been a lot of buyer’s remorse
from the Security Council regarding the interventions in Libya and Cote D’lviore and
criticism surrounding possible over extensions of their mandate. And then, in
terms of Russian and Chinese interests in Syria, both the Russians and the
Chinese have an interest in maintaining the status quo in Syria and keeping the
Assad regime in power. So, overall, the interventions in Libya
and Cote D’lviore reveals some future challenges to r2p, mainly there have been
a lot of criticisms of these interventions due to their ambiguous mandates and trying to figure out how to implement a
civilian protection mandate within an intervention and there’s also been the
new question of civilian protection versus regime change and how far these
interventions can actually go in intervening in the domestic matters of
the state to actually protect civilians. And then, finally, in terms of policy
implications the quantitative portion of my thesis has shown that RTP has been
used as a tool for preventive interventions for the UN, so in order to
better prevent these mass atrocities from even emerging in the first place
there should be a shift in focus from pillar 3 action under RTP which deals
with the use of force and the shift more towards pillars 1 and 2 which deals
with diplomatic and peaceful measures in order to prevent these mass atrocities
from even emerging in the first place. Thank you. Good morning everyone, thank
you for being here. My name is Kanani Schnider and today I’ll be presenting
my thesis: Erasing the Rohingya: The Historical Roots of Myanmar’s genocide.
I’d like to thank professor Erica Gould, my advisor David Cohen, and the rest of
the IR honors cooperate. Located in the heart of Southeast Asia,
Myanmar is a Buddhist country that recently was transitioned from an
authoritarian regime to a nominal of democracy. Although the vast majority of people
in Burma are ethnically Burman, Myanmar is home to numerous ethnic minorities as
well. However, in August of 2017 the military government began an ethnic
campaign in the northernmost reclined state, home to the Rohingya people, a
stateless Muslim minority. The government accuses the Rohingya of being illegal
Bengali immigrants, by December of 2017 the military scorched earth campaign had
driven 650,000 Rohingya to flee to refugee camps in Bangladesh.
Anti-rohingya sentiment disseminates to the Burmese populace
through multiple ways, one of them being extreme propaganda, such as this hateful
cartoon which circulated widely after the genocidal attacks in 2017 and mocked
the Rohingya’s plight. Here, we see the Rohingya symbolized by crocodiles
crossing the river to Bangladesh after killing Buddhists symbolized by the
innocent animals in the background. Once in Bangladesh, the crocodiles are
depicted as complaining to a Western reporter, “I had to flee the motherland.”
Such mockery begs the question why and how did this genocide begin? Hence my
research questions, in my thesis I firstly look at how the Rohingya’s
historical narrative is situated specifically in the context of Burmese
state building, secondly I look at the historical of the religious seeds of
Myanmar’s genocide, particularly why the Rohingya, of all ethnic minorities in
Myanmar, were targeted for genocide. These questions aim to address gaps in the
literature which, as of yet, rarely present the Rohingya in the context of
nation building and has yet to focus on the Rohingya in contrast to the
relationship with other minorities. For my methods,
I took a qualitative Human Rights approach to primary and secondary
sources to come up with my analysis and I begin by examining the theory that
exists behind the construction of national identity, and then apply such
theory to the case of Myanmar. In my thesis, I identified two factors, that of
religion and that of shared history, that I believe have the greatest influence
upon Burmese national identity, the same factors that the state is using to catch
the Rohingya as illegal Bengali immigrants. To answer my second question
of why the Rohingya, I conducted a case study analysis of two other minority
groups Burmese Muslims and the Quran people to highlight components of Rohingya
identity that have left them most vulnerable to the state. This matters
because so far there has been such little coverage, relatively, on the
genocide from the Rohingya people in general due to decades of systematic or
erasure by the state through legislation and
daily grievances. For today, after touching briefly on national identity,
I’d like to shift the majority of the focus to my case study analysis on
Burmese Muslims and the Quran and then leading into my thesis and broader
conclusions. So what does it mean to be Burmese? Well, in the history of Burmese
State Building it would be impossible to talk about Myanmar without talking about
the colonial legacy of the British. The British colonized Myanmar in 1886 and
used the divide and rule policy to exacerbate existing tensions that
existed within the country on ethnic cleavages and also humiliated Buddhist
monks which held a sanctified role in Burmese society by showing preferential
treatment to Burmese ethnic minorities. After Burma gained
independence in 1948 and the British withdrew from Burma because of WWII pressures, the resentment that had been built for decades by the majority
towards the minorities came to the fore. The effect of the British cannot be
overstated in terms of explaining what’s happening today in Myanmar, however it
would be overly reductive to say that this is the sole factor in causing the
outbreak of violence in 2017, this is specifically what the state wants people
to think as it decreases the amount of accountability that the state must hold.
While the Burmese Kingdom had oppressed people of our kind state far before
British arrival, the depiction is painted now that such divides existed only after
the British arrived but this is not true. Buddhism has always played a large role
in Burmese society which is a highly politicized, religious state. So, is there space in this formation of
nation-building in Myanmar for a Rohingya minority a stateless Muslim much
darker skinned group, the Rohingya people speak a dialect of Bengali and have been
stateless since the 1982 Citizenship Act which dropped them of their citizenship
and hence their freedom of movement. Linguistic evidence, census data and
documentation of Islam in the reclined state since the 9th century AD disproves
fully the states claims of the Rohini are illegal Bengali immigrants. While
ethnic minorities like the Rohingya in Myanmar abound the division of when one
the minority becomes another is highly contested. Most popularly, the Burmese
populace concurs that there are seven main ethnic groups, however recently the
authoritarian regime has published a list of the 135 ethnic groups.
Despite this large jump, one thing remains constant and that’s in both the
seven list and the 135 list, the Rohingya are consistently omitted. Nevertheless,
despite this confusion minority ethnic minorities in Burma abound and national
boundaries drawn in post-colonial states are arguably arbitrary and often cruelly
so. Myanmar is no exception to this as you’ll see from the map, the minorities
in Myanmar exist dominantly in the border states on the fringe of the
country. My key studies focus on the Rohingya, located in the northernmost
part of her kind state to the west on the Koran people located in the
easternmost state of Cayenne on the border of Thailand and then on Burmese
Muslims as a group at large centrally disbursed throughout the Irrawaddy delta
region of the middle of the country. So why these case studies? Well, analyzing
key identity factors that situate the Rohingya, Burmese Muslims, and the Karen
people from each other allowed me to better understand why the Rohingya were
targeted in particular. To do so, I’m looking at which factors have the
greatest predictive power in increasing Rohingya’s vulnerability. While Burmese
Muslims share religion with the Rohingya, they have the advantage of not being
geographically condensed in one area of the country. However, the Karen people are
geographically condensed in one area of the country, but their race and religion,
they trace their roots to the East Asian [inaudible] Kingdom and their religion is
primarily Buddhist, have less in conflict with the majority of the state. Despite
these differences, one thing remains and that’s that all three minorities were
highly favored by the British, which means that, today, all three minorities
are targets of the state’s resentment. I’ve compiled this table of the factors
of identity that I believe are most salient in explaining why the Rohingya in
2017 were targeted. Beginning with language. Burmese Muslims speak
predominantly Burmese and the Karen people speak a family and languages
that are rooted in the Tibetan-Burman branch of linguistics, as I mentioned
their geography, located in the East, the Karen people are also Buddhist, Animist
and at around 30% are Christian. What this means is that, while
the religion of the Rohingya people automatically makes them stand out, their
geography and their language also allow the state to create an evidentiary
basis for a faulty claim that there are illegal immigrants. This claim doesn’t
work so well with the Karen people whose language roots show that they’ve
been in that region for centuries as well as the fact that their ancestry has
been traced consistently so to the Hmong Kingdom, which would have been in that
region in the first place. Looking specifically at the ancestry of Burmese
Muslims, like those in rekind State, the State argues that a lot of them came
in during colonial times to be workers and thus were elevated to it
economic status higher than that of the majority while this is true, many of
those Muslims also have traced their their roots to be in Burma far before
the British arrival in 1886. What this means, essentially, is that the Burmese
state has used the seemingly evidentiary basis of geography and language to show
that the Rohingya are illegal immigrants whereas in reality those statements are
based more in the States Islamophobia and the states fear of the darker
skinned minority group. A vast amount of literature shows that such fears are
substantiated in the psychology of otherness. So, this has tremendous implications
with the legislation that serves to marginalize the Rohingya people. The
Rohingya people, unlike Burmese Muslims and the the Karen, are stateless. While Burmese
Muslims, some of them have lost their citizenship as well, the majority have
been relegated to carrying ID cards and are permitted to being in
the country, whereas the Karen legislative [inaudible] not only in their citizenship but also
in documents such as the Panglong agreement of 1947 on the eve of
independence which granted three minorities protection under the under
the law. The Rohingya, of course, were absent from such protections, and not only are
the absent from such protections but are growing increasingly absent in
documentation of every existing in Myanmar in the first place.
In 2014, the Rohingya were completely eliminated from the census while the
Burmese Muslims and the Karen were not. Circling back to this idea of, “Why then
were the Rohingya targeted?” I argue in my thesis that language and geography have
much more of a role than the current literature is stating. I think that in
the in the thesis, the role the British can’t be
overstated we must also be very cognizant to take other factors into
account, because it’s too reductive to point to only one. This is why, in my
thesis, I’m looking at the Rohingya in the context of state building pointing
to their religion and their shared historical narrative, and then discussing
why the Rohingya were targeted, again focusing on language and geography. The
conclusions to be drawn from this are that my thesis has brought much broader
implications, not just for the human rights atrocities committed against the Rohingya,
but also for what nation-building looks like in post-colonial states in general.
Because the coverage on the Rohingya is so little, it is very important that we pay
attention. Thank you. It’s the year 1991, and the Anita Hill is being questioned by a
roomful of congressmen about her recent accusation of sexual harassment against
Supreme Court justice nominee, Clarence Thomas. On a 52:48 book the Senate
confirms Aaron Thomas as the Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court. In the outreach that follows 1992 becomes known as the year of the woman,
48 women are elected to the house and six are already sitting in the Senate.
Since this watershed moment in 1992, women’s advancement into Congress has
continued at a slow, yet unremitting pace. Today, women composed 23.4% of Congress
and most congresswoman have not been appointed to powerful positions within
parties or committees. In existing literature on women in Congress there’s
a gap, there is little to no exploration of how female senators affect
legislative outcomes and, more important, why women are needed in politics. This
puzzle leads me to ask, between 1992 and 2015 how did the increase in women’s
representation in Congress affect legislative outcomes? In this thesis, I
make the case for Congresswomen arguing that gender parity in Congress is the
key to improve legislative outcomes. Today’s presentation is composed of four
sections first I’ll explore the existing theory about how women affect
legislative outcomes, next I’ll use regressions and case
to make the case for congresswoman, the regressions offer a quantitative
exploration of how women impact Congress and the quality of case studies offer an
in-depth analysis of two congressional transition from female to male
and vice versa. Finally, I’ll share the broad conclusion for my thesis. Let’s
begin with the theory, in the literature there are four main hypotheses about how
congresswomen affect legislative outcomes. First, the productivity
hypothesis posits that Congress women are more productive than their male
counterparts, in terms of the number of bills sponsored, especially given the
institutional barriers they face and making sure that an
introduced sponsorship becomes a law. In support of this, one author utilizes a
legislative effectiveness form to evaluate the trajectory of a bill
bill and finds that being a female lawmaker
translates into approximately a 10 percent increase in legislative
effectiveness, even further, women in both the majority and the minority party are
found to introduce more bills than their male counterparts. The second hypothesis
is that a diverse Congress leads to a diverse legislative outcome state-level data
from all states found that women prioritize legislation concerning women
children and family issues more than that and conversely
male legislators place priority on business [inaudible]. In this thesis,
I referred to this difference in priority areas as women’s [inaudible] the
third hypothesis is that Congress women have distinct leadership styles in terms
of greater collaboration and attention to the common good. Surveys of Congress
persons in 1995 and 2002 revealed that Congress women report spending more time
building within party and across party coalition’s than men and additionally
laboratory experiments repeatedly show that female subjects
more likely to desire universalistic outcomes and group cooperation
whereas male subjects tend to prefer competitive solutions these different
leadership styles often form the more liberal ideologies of congresswoman, as
human legislators are more liberal in terms of social welfare, consumer safety
and environmental regulations. They’re also more opposed to the use of force
both domestically and abroad. The final hypothesis is that Congress women more
effectively represent diverse constituencies. Women report spending
more time keeping in touch with constituents and the civic-mindedness
influences their emphasis on community representations. Furthermore, they more
effectively represent underrepresented minority groups for example to their
perspectives on social welfare or women’s health and public diets. With
these four hypotheses in mind we’ll move on to the crux of today’s presentation,
the regressions the data set you use covers all the senators between the
103rd and 114th Congress’s and it tests the first two hypotheses about
productivity and diverse legislative outcomes the model correlates gender in
a seminar with three dependent variables, productivity, diverse legislative,
outcomes, and effort allocation. So the independent variable here, the most
important thing that we’re looking at is the gender, and we’re thinking about how
that gender in the senator affects the three dependent variables those
dependent variables are productivity diverse legislative outcomes and effort
allocation. Productivity: do female senators sponsor more bills?
I selected bill sponsorship as an indicator of legislative productivity
because it most clearly reflects a legislators policy preferences for
considering Congress’s voting preferences.
Diverse legislative outcomes: do female senators produce more women’s issue
bills than their male counterparts that is education, Social Welfare,
civil rights liberties, and minority issues families and Housing and
Community Development. I chose these issue areas because various authors
posit that female legislators produce more of these kinds of bills.
The final dependent variable is effort allocation, do female senators devote
more of their overall goal sponsorship to women’s issues. There are three control
variables here political party, a majority party in Congress, and Senators
tenure. These controls are designed to remedy any biases that affect the
relationship between gender and the dependent variables and while such
controls can’t completely confirm causation, they can mitigate the effects
of extraneous factors. Moving on to our findings, the productivity model
considers gender and total number of bills sponsored, as you can see,
congressmen sponsor quite one more bills than their female counterparts, but the
results here are not statistically significant. The takeaway here is that
there is insufficient evidence to either confirm or disconfirm
the productivity hypothesis and further investigation will be needed on this front.
The diverse legislative outcomes regression considers whether congresswomen are more likely to sponsor a women’s issue bills and when including
controls for gender, party, majority, and tenure as well as Congress and state [inaudible] the coefficient is 0.7. This means that for every 1.7 women’s issue
bills sponsored by a man, his female colleague sponsors 2.4 of such bills
thus we can conclude that the inclusion of Congress women diversified the
overall bill sponsorship. Third and finally, the effort allocation regression
also affirms the diverse legislative outcomes hypothesis, this model asks
whether women are more likely to devote a larger share of their overall bill
sponsorships to women’s issue bills, so the answer here is yes. Women devote 1.5
percent more of their overall bill sponsorship to these women’s issues bills. Based on the model, there was sufficient evidence to confirm the
diverse legislative options hypothesis. At this point, at the very least, this
thesis has illustrated the need for women in Congress because
they bring diversity to the types of bills that are being sponsored. The
diversity often better incorporates the policy needs of underrepresented
minority groups such as women, [inaudible] disadvantaged, and communities of
color. For the sake of time today, I won’t delve into the second piece of the
empirics, the case studies. But it is important to note that they do confirm the
four hypotheses, case one is the male to female transition from Frank Murkowski to
Lisa murkowski in Alaska in 2002. Case two is the female to male transition
from carol Moseley-Braun to Peter Fitzgerald’s in Illinois in 1998. The key
takeaway from these four cases is that they do offer support for the hypotheses
of productivity, diverse legislative outcomes, distinct leadership styles, and
representational focus. Finally, we’ll conclude today with the broader
conclusions from my thesis, if there is anything for you to take away from
today’s presentation it’s that between 1992 and 2015 the
increasing women’s representation in the United States Congress immensely
affective legislative outcomes for the better. In terms of productivity, while
the regression does not confirm this hypothesis the case examples indicate
that the most legislators indeed do sponsored bills more bills per session
Lisa Murkowski sponsored 46 bills on average per session
compared to Frank Murkowski’s 41 bills. Similarly Carol Moseley-Braun sponsored
20 bills per session compared to Peter Fitzgerald’s 16 bills.
While these are individual cases, the differences do you reflect a greater
priority on bill sponsorship by the female senators being studied, in terms
of diverse alleged state of outcomes, as mentioned in the regression, women
sponsors 0.7 more women’s issue bills and devote 1.5 percent more of their bill
sponsorship to such issues areas as also proven by the cases.
And finally, the cases similarly confirmed the collaborative leadership
styles and representational focus of female senators. Time has passed and
progress toward gender equality has been made, but in some ways, things are very
much the same the same the need for gender equality in Congress is clear not
just to match the 50/50 composition of the American electorate, but moreover
because there are clear benefits from gender parity in Congress and
recognizing these truths, this thesis seeks to make the case for Congresswomen. To conclude,
I’d like to share my gratitude to the people without whom this undertaking would
not have been possible, to the IR cohort, thank you for your constant commiseration, to Professor Gould, thank you. for encouraging us to reach our greatest
potential and finally to my advisor professor Gary Cox, of the political
science department, thank you for answering my infinite questions, teaching
me more than I could have imagined and supporting me with for relentless the
patience and encouragement, to everyone thank you for listening and during the
next election cycle, vote for woman. Good morning everyone, my name is Renata
Miller and today I’m presenting on my thesis titled: “Closing the Floodgates: The
Origins of U.S. Immigration Policy Towards Latin America and the 1965
Hart-Celler Act” My advisor throughout this year as my professor is Zephyr Frank, I owe him many thanks too. So, here’s a brief roadmap of my presentation today, always
starting with the introduction which includes relevance in today the current literature on the subject and my research question.
Then I will overview methodology followed y my empirical deep dive into my
analysis of the House of Representatives. I will then finish with some closing
thoughts. Here are some recent headlines that I’m sure you are all familiar with:
the debate over immigration, in particular immigration from Latin
America has been front and center in the in the United States
these articles highlight some of the largest controversies such as the debate
over family reunification or chain migration and the Central American
migrant caravan late last year. Many of these articles discuss a bill in particular
the 1965 Hart-cellar act. Admidst this immigration debate, journalists and
scholars are looking back to this bill because it is the foundation of our
immigration system today, many of our current immigration policies such as
family reunification can be traced back to this act. So, the 1965 Hart-celler act was a
revolutionary bill because it abolished the racist National Origins quota system
which had been in place before, it opened up the country to immigrants from often
Africa and Asia for the first time and eliminated the focus on admitting only
white immigrants. But what did this bill say about immigration from Latin America?
this is an important question to ask given that immigration from south of the
border is a great concern today. The 1965 Hart-Celler art placed a cap on
immigration from what from the Western Hemisphere for the first time, prior to
then there had been no numerical upper limit for Latin American immigrants, the
scholarly literature on this issue does not address this policy effectively.
Most of the literature on the Hart-Celler act focuses on the bill as a liberal
force, a civil rights era bill that eliminated a determining citizenship
based on skin color. The handful of scholars that do discuss the Western
Hemisphere more in-depth are listed here.
However they each conclude that is not possible to know why the cap was
added because it was a compromise made behind closed doors.
My thesis addresses this gap in the literature but using statistical analysis to determine what influenced the vote in Congress. That brings me here
to my research question: Why did Congress add a cap on the Western Hemisphere in
the 1965 Hart-Celler act? This question is especially important today because
scholars have credited this policy to the rise of illegal immigration. American
Historians, [inaudible], stated in her work and possible subject
that the inclusion of the Western Hemisphere cap invariable invariably
produced even higher levels of illegal immigration and made it the central
problem that is preoccupied American immigration policy throughout the late
20th and into the 21st century. In other words, she views the permission and
question as one of the root causes of our crisis today because it restricted
the number of allotted legal immigrants from Latin America. In order to address
immigration reform today, it is essential to know what brought about our current
policies. In my thesis, I argue that Congress out of this count on Latin
America and 1965 mostly because of economic concerns
those that voted in favor of this cap fear that an influx of immigrants from
Latin America would overwhelm government programs. I answer this
question by doing separate analyses at the House of Representatives and at the
Senate the House vote on the provision on August 25th of 1965 while a Senate
added the provision in closed-door sessions during the month of August 1965
for each chamber I conducted both the statistical analysis, world first for a
statistical analysis, and approach that has not been used by scholars to answer
this puzzle, I then qualify my statistical findings by citing quotes
from the House and Senate floor debates. Today, I will be briefly presenting just
my empirical findings for the House of Representatives vote. The possible
question you might ask is why I even focus on the House of Representatives if
the amendment was successfully added in the Senate? Even though the amendment
failed in the house, it is still useful to analyze it in order to identify the
coalition’s on each side of the vote in addition analyzing the house is
beneficial because smaller district sizes provide us with more specific
regional U.S. interests. For my statistical regression, my dependent variable is
Congress is Congress members yay or nay vote on placing a cap on Western
Hemisphere immigration. In order to choose my
variables I had to consider what affected Congress members to vote one way or the
other. The following slides will delineate my independent variables and
also provide visualizations of House districts in 1965 I created these maps
by downloading a shape file of the 1965 congressional districts and I’m matching
it to district level data which I digged up from the 1965 US census. The most
obvious variable to start with is party affiliation of Congress members, on this
map Republican districts are labeled red while Democratic districts are labeled
blue from the 1965 House. Nevertheless, party is a muddled indicator because
this time the American party system was undergoing a shift, on social issues, many
Southern Democrats voted liberally on economic issues, but conservative on
social issues for example senator Sam Ervin, the Democrat representing North
Carolina and who is also a leader in this bill of the Senate voted in favor
of many Great Society government programs but was also a vocal proponent
of preserving Jim Crow laws. For this reason, I use pul nominee scores of
Congress members as my next independent variables. Pul nominee scores
breakdown ideology into two scores, one economic and one social, each on the
liberal/conservative continuum the two maps on the right show the ideological
breakdown of 1965 Congress members. Using nominee scores as variables provides a
more precise measure of Congress member’s belief in the role of government
and the economy and on social issues. My next variable is the percentage of
Mexican immigrants in each Congress members districts in 1965, I include this
variable because Congress members with a larger percentage of Mexican immigrants
in their district had an incentive to vote against the western hemisphere cap
because their districts economy is dependent on that labor, I also include
the percentage of farmers per district for a similar reason, Mexican immigrants
were mostly employed in agriculture, and so, in theory, Congress members with
stronger agricultural should have voted against the cap. Finally, this
brings me to my results for my regression model with the previously
mentioned variables. The three statistically significant variables are
the percentage of Mexican immigrants, economic ideology, and social ideology. My
hypothesis for the effects of Mexican immigrants per district where current
was correct. Congress members of four Mexican immigrants per district were
more likely to vote against the cap, my more interesting finding is the one with
ideology, although most of the current literature from the Hart-Celler act focuses
on the social debate in Congress, here it is could this vote was more about
economic ideology given that the coefficient is much larger. What exactly
does this mean? This table shows our economic and social positions for the
Hart-Celler Bill, economic conservatives were strongly opposed to an influx of
Latin American immigrants because they believed that this would overwhelm
government support programs, meanwhile, social conservatives were in favor at
the cap because they wanted to limit the number of non-white immigrants. My
statistical results show that economic concerns were a strong force behind the
vote. My next section will then provide quotes from the house or debate that
actually show these economic concerns. On April 25th, the day of the vote in the
house, representative Chelf, Republican of Kentucky, said on the House floor, “It is
coming, we’re going to have to adopt this amendment at some point because within
the next 35 years there will be six hundred million people down south of the
border. Merciful heavens where’re you going to put them all,
we simply cannot literally push our own family out of our own home in order to
take in our neighbors who live on the same block. I repeat, I love our long
American friends and all who reside in the Western Hemisphere, but I love
America first, last, and always.” Many Congress members were
similarly predicting a population explosion in Latin America and saying that
the United States had to place a cap onto those immigrants. The argument was
that the United States would not be able to accommodate such a vast number.
During the same debate representative O’Neill, a Democrat from Georgia, stated
“You must also considered that this new influx of immigrants from underdeveloped
nations will compound our domestic problems, they will compete with the very
cost of American citizens our federal government is seeking to aid through its
war on poverty the president either fails or refuses to understand that America is
not hurting from population jobseekers or illiterates.” The next step of this
economic argument was that this influx of Latin American immigrants would
overwhelm American government programs. For economic conservatives who despise
big government, they fear that unskilled thought American immigrants would arrive
and become dependent on welfare programs. Many other Congress members who voted to
place to place the cap also express similar fears to those of representative
O’Neill. I’ve shown that the economic debate was more important to the
imposition of the Western Hemisphere cap than previously thought. But why is this
important? First off, this finding as to the current literature on the Hart-Celler act, it addresses a question that multiple scholars have asked yet have
not found an answer to. In addition, it is important to understand this policy
because it is credited for the rise in illegal immigration. In 1965,
whole groups of immigrants from Mexico Latin America, whose entrance to the US
would have been considered legal before 1965, suddenly became illegal. This was
the first major clampdown immigration from south of the border. What I’ve
personally found most interesting during my research is how much our debate over
Latin American immigration today echoes the debate of 1965, those
earlier quotes could easily been cited 2019. It shows that we have been having
the same debate for many years, in order to solve our immigration crisis today
and move forward, we must understand where our current policies came from. Good morning, thank you for coming. My
name is Hana Kapasi and I’m presenting my thesis today: The decision to prosecute
accountability for human rights violations in Chile and Argentina after
military regimes. I want to say thank you as always have to the IR cohort
Professor Gould and especially my advisor professor Francis Fukuyama. So, these are
images of protests from Chile and Argentina in the late 1980s against
military regimes that carried out human rights abuses against civilians. In the
bottom photo the rape scene is another subclass of the Maya who protested in
one of scientists asking for answers as to where there disappeared loved ones
went. Nora Cortinez a member of this group,
explained her experience as such, “Now we are not the mothers of just one child, we are
the mothers of all the disappeared our biological children became 30,000
children, for them we gave birth to a full political and public life.” These niños desaparecidos, or disappear children, were part of at least 5,000
Chileans and nearly 30,000 Argentines who had disappeared. But thousands of
others who were exiled tortured and murdered by the military regimes. After
transitioning to democracy, these countries became cornerstones in the
movement for international human rights prosecutions and understanding how in the
the modern world, past regimes would be responsible for crimes committed during
their regimes. Argentina and Chile were faced with a difficult task of how to
heal from mass atrocities while still maintaining some unity and faith in
government institutions. So the question of reconciliation faced by Argentina and
Chile are not limited to those two countries, calls for justice in all forms
are heard around the world today. Tunisia, Sri Lanka, Venezuela to name a few. Our
country is struggling with how to handle human rights abuses by past regimes many
of these transitional states are looking to historical examples to understand the
main prosecution can play and national healing so because of their role in
establishing precedent for global human rights prosecutions and accountability,
Chile and Argentina serve as strong case studies. Looking at the causal mechanisms
for prosecutions in the two countries can provide insight into who are the
important actors in pushing for prosecutions, what circumstances make
prosecutions feasible, and what types of prosecutions are more effective for
retributive justice and Reconciliation? These countries can offer lessons for
how to heal after national trauma and how we can encourage this reconciliation
today. So to contribute to the study of how and why certain methods of
accountability are used, I asked two questions. The first is how does the
quantity and choice of judicial mechanisms for Human Rights prosecute
students in Chile and Argentina differ? And the second question is
what was the role of political legitimacy in the decision to prosecute
human rights abuses? So as a roadmap of the presentation I will start briefly by
explain the existing arguments for prosecution trends that will talk about
my research design but I’ll focus the bulk of my presentation on my findings
and discussion of these results. So to start with the existing arguments,
there are three main groups of literature about human rights
prosecutions and democratic transitions, the first is power.
So, with this literature is focuses on actors that are important in democratic
transitions and the desires of those actors.
It suggests that the negotiating power of the actors involved is a prominent
determinant in the wualities of the democracy that is to come. Second, you
have a normative argument for human rights prosecutions and this is a moral
argument that prosecutions for human rights should occur because of the right
thing to do and they’re necessary for national healing. And finally, there’s the
comparative argument which focuses on the influence of countries with similar
experiences cultural backgrounds or geographic proximity on how
countries understand prosecution trends the diffusion effective prosecution
mechanisms is central in this literature. So in the literature that exists, this
generally focuses on democratic stability and how it preserved and how
it preserved in its preserving countries but it doesn’t really focus on how human
rights prosecutions as accountability mechanisms are related to that process
these prosecutions were used as bargaining points amongst actors during
the transition and so my thesis seeks to provide insight into how the cases of
Chile and Argentina use democratic stability and human rights prosecutions of
intertwined mechanisms that reflect each other. So moving into my research design,
I have two main parts, so the first part of it focuses on prosecution details. So
in this section I collected information about human rights trials in Chile
Argentina related to the military dictatorship and the goal of this was to
provide a comparison of not only the quantity and timespan of these
prosecutions, but also details like domestic versus international trials, the
crimes people were accused of, verdicts appeals, and ranking the accused. The
second part of this pieces is where I build a story about the main actor
influence of prosecution trends in both countries immediately following the
transition to democracy through speeches, newspaper, articles, and congressional
records. I explained the role of political legitimacy democratic
preservation and negotiating power and accountability and transitional justice.
So I’m very briefly discussed the causal mechanism section but I’m going to focus
on prosecution details and I’m happy to go into more detail about the cause of
action is in the live Q&A portion. So, moving into my findings, to start off I
wanted to take a big-picture look at the trends in the two countries. So this
graph shows the number of prosecutions, the GDP growth rate, and the political
parties each year. So noteworthy within Argentina is that the prosecutions are
concentrated immediately after the transition to democracy and also that
there has been a large amount of political turnover. So I show the
different parties in the colored bar underneath two years. Notable in 2001
there were three different executives in power at that time so there has been a
lot of transition in this country. Looking at Chile, it’s clear that
Chile’s prosecutions occurred many years after the transition to democracy, the
shades of blue for political parties all represent parties that were part of the
coalition which is the [inaudible] coalition that took took power after the
transition to democracy. So it indicates that there was a long period of
political consistency in Chile after Pinochet. So examining these broader
trends gives a good sense of place and time for the context of these
prosecutions, but it doesn’t give detail about how these two countries and
mechanisms for prosecutions actually differed, so for that I’ll show some
notable trends in the two countries prosecutions. So, to start off, looking at
the rank of those who are prosecuted in the military regimes, it shows whether the
person on trial was a high middle or low ranking within military and the administration
of power. So the trends between these two countries, as you can see, we’re nearly
the same, indicating that both chose to pursue the high level officials at the
highest rates. So the second slide shows the number of counts, so number counts is
the number of crimes for which the person on trial was being held
accountable for these there are large amounts of unknown data heres as you can
sees especially with Argentina. So, in the sources that I use there was some
ambiguity and I tried to fill in the gaps from these reports from human
rights organizations but there’s still a lot missing. Part of the reason that they
may be missing is because large accounts may have varied during the trials based
with new information being brought forward, also there’s a mixture of
domestic and international trials and so there’s different recording mechanisms,
but I wanted to mention that still for the data that is here because there’s
you can see in Argentina there was a focus on accusing people who were tried
for greater counts, so over a hundred counts per person being accused. And that
suggests that the court’s reporting high-ranking officials accountable for a
wide breadth of crimes in Argentina, while in Chile the focus was on specific
crimes that were documented and not broad standing violations of human
rights as you can see the majority are concentrated in
less than 10 counts. So looking at the verdict this is the most disperate trend
between two countries with all but one trial resulting in guilty verdicts in
Argentina and a lot more variance in Chile The significance of this difference
in trends could be the result of specific selection of cases to pursue, so
in other words Argentine courts could have been select within the cases they
chose to try for the purpose of projecting an image of accountability. By
trying members of the [inaudible] against whom they have the most substantive evidence,
the new Argentine democracy could visibly demonstrate its difference from
the military road map and provide accountability for citizens it could
also be indicative of greater documentation of the crimes by the
military regimes in Argentina when compared to Chile. So finally I will
look at the crimes that people were accused of in these trials and it’s
noteworthy that the majority of charges in Chile were for homicide and murder,
abduction kidnapping, and disappearances. in Argentina, the crimes are prosecuted
were evenly distributed amongst charges so aligning with the trends with
verdicts the number of these trials relates to crimes against humanity and
international human rights violations in Argentina suggest there might have been
more judicial freedom to prosecute for those crimes.
So the first the focus on the homicide, murder, and kidnapping in Chile suggests
the accusation of crimes against humanity or human rights abuses was more
contentious and thus the prosecutors were more hesitant to try. So to
summarize the important takeaways from this,
both countries targeted high-ranking officials implying that they were the
ones most responsible for human rights abuses Chile focused on its prosecutions
on individual crimes that were committed while Argentina tried leaders for
widespread violations of human rights with the counts being of over 100 there
was a difference in verdict trends which suggest that there was a different
process process for selecting who to try and how much evidence was necissary
in those trials and finally these types of crime being crimes being tried for
worth different with Chile being focused on crimes like a abduction or
homicide instead of crimes against humanity. So, as I mentioned earlier,
there’s a second part of my thesis focusing on a causal mechanism, as I
mentioned it’s just going to very briefly mention this but both countries
have similar actors who’ve influenced the decision to prosecute and the
methods with which prosecution’s were carried out these actors were the most
influential groups in defining how these prosecutions happen and, in Argentina, the
executive found it politically and electorally opportune to advocate for
prosecutions as soon as the transition to democracy occurred, while in Chile, the
existing military had a legitimacy and negotiating power, so they were able to
protect themselves from initial prosecutions. When financial scandal and
international pressure for accountability increase though, the
democratic government started to prosecute as it was no longer a threat
to legitimacy and stability. So, just to summarize my answers here a for this
question about political legitimacy and I said Argentina’s prosecuted most
humbly immediately after the transition due to institutional support and
political opportunity while in Chile they sought Democratic stability through
compromise leading to amnesty for the military regime until political
opportunity for prosecution arose, but to just finish this out I want to
come back to the country and the people that are seeking accountability
today and what the implications of this are for them. So in order to understand
how a country undergoing political transition can uphold faith in its new
institutions and reconcile with past abuses, we need to look at the powerful
actors in the country, the executives, the military, the citizens, and the interest
groups. Understanding the bargaining choices that have been made and will be
made will allow us to contextualise and perhaps even advocate for human rights
and human rights prosecutions. The lesson from Chile and Argentina still ring true
today and continue to provide us with framework for understanding the
intersection of democracy legitimacy and human rights.
Thank you. Good morning everyone, my name is Audrey Winn, and today I will be presenting
my honors thesis research the history of sexual violence in the Vietnam War and
opportunities for justice. Before I begin I want to provide a quick content
warning, this presentation contains very graphic depictions of sexual violence
and more please feel free to step out at any time and take care of yourself as
needed. In 1969, Life magazine published a series
of graphic images of the Me Lai Massacre captured by U.S. Army
photographer Ronald Taber Lee during the Vietnam War.
The images instantly catapulted the Me Lai massacre and other mass atrocities
committed by U.S. veterans to the forefront of national and international
attention. Here is one of the most poignant images to arise from the
collection on the right side of the photograph, we see a young woman
curiously buttoning her black blouse. Why would she be fixing her shirt while
others are huddled in terror moments before being killed by American troops.
This question sparked the interest of U.S. Army criminal investigators who later
revealed that this young woman who became known as the black blouse girl
had just been sexually assaulted. Further investigation into the Me Lai massacre
proved that U.S. soldiers assault of the black box girl was far from an
aberration and that mass rapes had occurred at Me Lai
however to this day no representation of the clack blouse girl in museums, in
public spaces, in publications, or films include any mention of her assaul the
silence surrounding this woman’s experience is emblematic of the greater
systemic erasure of sexual violence from American public memory and narratives of
the Vietnam War. Despite extensive primary evidence of sexual violence
perpetrated by the U.S. military against Vietnamese civilians, little to no
literature exists on the subject. In fact in my thorough review of the secondary
literature I identified only two scholarly texts that explore that issue of sexual
violence in the Vietnam War at all. The broad exclusion of crimes of sexual
violence from academic and public memory not only inhibits the development of an
accurate and rigorous historical narrative, but also delegitimizes the
experiences of Vietnamese survivors and of U.S. veterans. In an effort to address
this significant gap in our understanding of the Vietnam War, my
research with it will explore the following questions what is the history
of sexual violence perpetrated by the U.S. military against Vietnamese civilians
during the Vietnam War and what legal and political mechanisms existed to
bring justice to these victims? And second what historical models of
transitional justice are best suited to address kinds of wartime sexual violence
and how might these models be applied in the context of Vietnam? Today, I will
focus only on the first part of this first question: What is the history of
sexual violence in the Vietnam War? I’ll begin with a description of my research
methodology, I’ll then share my empirical findings regarding patterns of sexual
violence in the war, and I’ll conclude with a discussion of the ongoing relevance and
significance of my research in Vietnamese and American society today. In
order to construct a comprehensive historical narrative of sexual violence
in the Vietnam War, I’ve conducted qualitative textual
analysis of hundreds of primary and secondary sources containing testimony
for US military personnel and Vietnamese civilians these sources included U.S.
military records course transcript U.S. soldiers memoirs as well as Vietnamese
survivors memoirs and oral histories. To analyze one of my largest bodies of
historical evidence the Vietnam war crimes working group case files, I
traveled to the National Archives in Maryland last summer to view 246 case
files documenting over 300 allegations of war crimes by U.S. forces and including
over 400 Vietnamese victims of sexual violence. To my knowledge, these records
had never been explored in relation to crimes of sexual violence. In addition, I
conducted qualitative interviews with former private first class John Ketwick who served in Vietnam from 1967 to 1968, as well as Professor Fred Turner
who interviewed dozens of U.S. veterans about collective trauma. I also conducted
qualitative interviews with Vietnamese advocates, activists, academics, and
diplomats and Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in January 2019. I then conducted
thematic content analysis of all of these documents and audio transcripts to
identify heat patterns and trends in sexual violence perpetrated by the U.S.
military the corroborative of quality across these
various accounts of sexual violence proved that sexual violence was a
systematic and daily occurrence of the war that received official acquiescence.
Before I present my findings, it is important to note that these sources
should not be viewed as a representative sample of all U.S. veterans or all
Vietnamese civilians experiences during the war. It is also possible that some
accounts have been altered, sensationalized, or even minimized. I’d be
happy to answer any questions regarding these limitations after the presentation.
I’ve organized my findings into four key themes that emerge for my analysis, the
evidence I will share now is drawn directly from the testimonies of U.S.
soldiers and Vietnamese survivors found throughout my sources. The first theme
that emerged from a Content analysis was the dehumanization of Vietnamese woman
which I believe directly contributed to the sexual violence committed by
American GIs. From the beginning of military training, commanding officers
instilled the belief among draftees to Vietnam that Vietnamese women were quote, “Dinks, villains, creatures akin to communists, and sexual objects to be
dominated and possessed.” U.S. veteran Jim Roseberry said that in basic training
Vietnamese women were considered pieces of meat. American GIs said they don’t even
think of Vietnamese women as human beings, they’re dukes. According to
Professor Heather Marie Stur, when combined with racism the divided nation
of Vietnamese women by the U.S. military led to mass rape and murder. My sources
also illustrate rape as a standard operating procedure, an unofficial policy
of the U.S. military. By unofficial policy I mean that commanding officers not only
passively condone the sexual violence but in some cases actively promoted and
even participated in it according to an unidentified panelist in the marine
corps, the following instructions took place during infantry training regimen
in a class that taught soldiers how to properly examine villagers in order to
find valuable intelligence, quote “When US soldiers went through the villages and
searched people, the woman would have all their clothes taken off and the U.S.
soldiers would use their penises to probe them to make sure they didn’t have
anything hidden anywhere.” This was raping but it was done as searching. Multiple
veterans confirmed this training, in the 9th Infantry Division instructions from
a platoon sergeant in the ninth infantry division said, “If there’s a woman in a
hooch lift up her dress, you know, and tell by her sex, if it’s a male kill
him and if it’s a female rape her.” Ed Murphy provide provided a
particularly damning depiction of rape as military policy in which he explains
that his platoon leader was quote, “Condoning everything that was going on
because was a part of policy, he would condone rape because who was he in a mass
military policy?” My sources also corroborated the use of sexual violence
as a weapon of war based on secondary literature, we know that the practice of
gang rape, mass rape, and rape used as a tool of interrogation is symptomatic of
the use of rape as a weapon of war as distinct from rape as an incidental
phenomenon of war. These methods are often employed to punish and humiliate the
enemy and to instill terror and shame among the civilian population. All three
practices were extraordinarily prevalent in a sexual violence that took place in
Vietnam. In regards to gang rape, seventy-five
percent of cases of sexual violence in the winter soldier investigation were
gang rape cases and fifty percent of cases of sexual violence in the Vietnam
war crimes working group files were also gang rape. Without including the
graphic descriptions of these instances, I will note that such a
disproportionately high rate of gang rape is often correlated with the use of
rape as a weapon of war. Next in the cases in the Vietnam war
crimes working group case files they describe incidences of mass rape in
which the U.S. military would raid rural Vietnamese villages and rape hundreds of
women at a time. Here are a few testimonies from the oral histories of Vietnamese
civilians, I’ll read one, “The American soldier has killed every family they
found in the shelters, they rounded up the woman they cut off their hair and
cut off their ears and they raped them.” Finally across my sources, many anecdotes
were shared by female prisoners of war regarding the use of torture and
interrogation. David Bang writes rape was an ever-present coercive force
in field interrogations the procedure in the units was to isolate a woman from
the rest of her family and her village, she would be tied up
threatened and raped regardless of what she told her captors. Altogether these
phenomenon illustrate the extent to which rape was employed as a weapon of
war by the U.S. military in Vietnam. Finally, across my sources evidence
emerged of deliberate impunity in the U.S. military’s response to sexual violence,
this included significant peer pressure placed on U.S. military personnel not to
report these crimes as well as the widespread failure of commanding
officers to respond to, investigate, and punish these crimes, despite extensive
knowledge of what was going on. Richard Brummit wrote that, “Random murder
rape and pillage upon the Vietnamese civilians was done with the full
knowledge consent and participation of our commanding officers.” John Kerry added,
“You couldn’t say anything, if you said anything, your own buddies were turned
against you.” This impunity continued at the institutional level, 25 percent of
cases in the Vietnam war crimes working group case files related to sexual
violence and again, these are considered the most atrocious crimes to have
occurred in the war, were never to been open for criminal investigation 80% of
the cases never underwent any form of adjudication and nearly all charges that
were made were dropped entirely or to significantly lesser crimes. In this way
the culture of impunity manifested in the weak or non-existent investigative
and juridical processes initiated by the U.S. military in response to these crimes.
Although rigorous statistical evidence of sexual violence in the Vietnam War
has never been collected, the corroberative quality of the accounts of sexual
violence documented in military investigations, government records,
soldiers memoirs, as well as Vietnamese survivors, and oral histories is
incredibly powerful across identities and experiences. Many U.S. soldiers and
Vietnamese civilians describe a rampant culture of sexual violence throughout
the war in which Vietnamese women were dehumanized, sexual violence was accepted,
as unofficial military policy, and systematic rape was employed as a weapon of war.
Such behavior was met with silence suppression and widespread immunity. In
the latter half of my thesis, I began to explore potential mechanisms of
transitional justice that might work to address these crimes.
Overall my research offers only a brief glimpse into the long and painful
history of sexual violence perpetrated by the U.S. military and Vietnam as a
result of the severe lack of documentation and reporting of these
crimes. Many gaps in this historical narrative may never be fully addressed,
nevertheless I believe continued efforts to uncover more of this history and draw
public attention to these crimes is necessary both to interrogate issues of
militarized masculinity and to encourage U.S. accountability for the war crimes we commit. Finally, and most importantly, I hope my research starts to
acknowledge, validate, and memorialize, the experiences of Vietnamese survivors like
the black blouse girl, whose voices have been unjustly silenced and whose
legacies live on in Vietnamese and American society today. Good morning everyone, my name is Elena and today I will be presenting to you the culmination of my research project over the past year. Once again, to reiterate, I’d like to
thank the IR honors cohort for all of your support professor Erica Gould as well and [inaudible] my thesis advisor, professor Penna Schultz. Today I’m going to be talking about the relationship between mass killings and transnational terrorism. But first I’d like to
give you a brief story in the 1960s the 1980s and the 1990s the Indonesian
government targeted it’s a Acehnese Muslim people, killing around 400,000. The
terrorist group, the Free Aceh Movement, emerges from these Acehnese peoples and
claims to represent them, calling for a separate Acehnese state within
Indonesian. From 1977 to 2005 the Free Aceh movement have committed over 100 terrorist
attacks, several of these became transnational attacks resulting in headlines such as this one. The question that my thesis addresses- the broader question of
my thesis addresses regards whether or not this phenomenon is generalizable.
More specifically, I will be asking the question do terrorist groups that emerge
from or claim to represent the victims of a mass killing commit more or fewer
transnational acts of terrorism than other terrorist groups? During my
presentation for today I will be talking about my more specific questions, going
into my hypotheses, delineating my research design, and introducing my
quantitative and qualitative empirics as well as some final concluding remarks. My more specific three questions for my
thesis project are as follows do, terrorist groups that emerge from or
represent victims of mass killings commit more or fewer transnational acts
of terrorism than other terrorist groups? Do these terrorist groups commit more or
fewer transnational acts of terrorism after the mass killing than they did
before the mass killing? And when we do countries produce more or fewer
transnational acts of terrorism after they have experience a mass killing? In order to answer these questions it is first imperative to identify a few key terms.
These key terms are mass killing, terrorism, and transnational terrorism
all of these definitions are widely used and widely regarded throughout the
political science literature. Now into some theoretical frameworks in the
political science literature on transnational terrorism, there are many
factors such as these that are regarded as producers or causal mechanisms for
transnational terrorism, because mass killings are inherently violent, produce
refugee camps, result from ethnic tensions, perpetuate political
disenfranchisement, create a sense of urgency and a desire for revenge, it is
understandable to make the assumption that mass killings might also be a
factor of transnational terrorism on their own. With this research I would
fill the gap in the political science literature that does not currently
address mass killings as a factor of transnational terrorism with my
quantitative and my qualitative analysis. according to Kydd and Walter, there are
four main end goals that terrorists have and that influence the distribution of
attacks, these end goals are regime change, territorial change, policy change, or
social control. Depending on these specific end goals terrorists will try to
influence a specific audience through their different types of transnational
attacks. The three types of audience is identified by Kydd and Walter are
sympathizers, who are partial to the terrorist groups cause, antagonists, who
terrorists attempt to coerce or intimidate, and neutrals, who terrorists attempt to
gain the attention of. Mass killings transnational terrorism because these
victim groups are trying to attain international aid or attention to stop,
punish, or overthrow the regime that is perpetrating them. From these theoretical
frameworks, I’ve developed three original hypotheses, the first being that
terrorist groups that emerge from or claim to represent victims of mass
killings commit more transnational acts of terrorism than other terrorist
groups, the second being that these terrorist groups to emit more
transnational acts of terrorism after the mass killing than they did before
the mass killing, and the third being that countries that experienced mass
killings will produced more transnational acts of terrorism after
this mass killing to answer- to cut these hypotheses, I first identified the victim
groups of the 121 mass killings identified by Ofeller and Valatino
from 1945 to 2006, next I determined the affiliated terrorist groups with these
masskilling victims and emerged this data set with the global
terrorism database data from 2016 as well as Rickman and Rickman with data on
transnational terrorism. The final data set looks something like this
organized by terrorist attacks and with containing the following
information. In order to compare terrorist groups that have been victims
of mass killings to other terrorist groups,
it was first necessary for my study to define what these different types of
terrorist groups might be, the first being mass killing victims or MKV groups
the terrorist group type of interest, the second being mass killing country victims
or MKC groups which are terrorist groups that were active in a country during a
mass killing but were not victims of that mass killing. Finally all other
terrorist groups were categorized in the other category. To test hypothesis one, I
first have deleted the percentage of transnational attacks per terrorist
group, this data was an aggregated at the terrorist group type level in order to calculate the average percentage of transnational attacks per group type. The
resulting information shows that the average percentage of transnational
attacks per MKV groups is around 14% this increases to 21% for MKC groups and
increases to 32% for other groups. Because terrorist groups that have been
victims of mass killings do not commit more transnational acts of terrorism
than other terrorist groups, the results are inconsistent with hypothesis 1.
To test hypotheses 2, I calculated the average difference in the
annual rate of transnational attacks committed by terrorist groups that have
been victims of mass killings before the mass killing and after the mass killing.
As can be seen by this red vertical line representing this average, terrorist
groups that have been victims of mass killings commit around one less
transnational act of terrorism per year after the mass killing than they did
before the mass killing. Because of this result that shows that terrorist groups
that have been victims of mass killings commit fewer transnational acts of
terrorism after the mass killing, the results are inconsistent with hypothesis
two. To test hypothesis three, I aggregated the
terrorist attacks at the country level, then, as shown by the graph on the left
hand side the average number of annual attacks per country per year were
calculated for before the mass killing and after the mass killing. This difference
was then calculated as well. On average countries that experienced mass killing
to produce three more transnational acts of terrorism after the mass killing than
they did before the mass killing, these results, because countries that have
experienced produce more international terrorism are
consistent with hypothesis three. But why is this- why is this the case? Why do terrorists groups that have been victims of mass killings not commit more
transnational acts of terrorism than other terrorist groups and commit less
transnational acts of terrorism after the mass killing than they did before
the mass killing despite the fact that countries that have experienced mass
killings produce more transnational acts of terrorism after the mass killing than
they did before the mass killing. The first possible explanation for this
lines in the test for hypothesis two. Out of the 263 terrorist groups that have
been victims of mass killings only 14 of them existed before the mass killing
occurred this means that the majority of these terrorist groups formed during or
after the mass killing was targeting them. Because the previous two tests
focus on the distribution of attacks of terrorist groups that have been victims
of mass killings, they’re not able to quantify how mass killings affect the
creation of new terrorist groups who does perpetuate more transnational
terrorism. The second possible explanation for these dichotomies
results lie in the test for hypothesis one. Because this study assumes that
victims of mass channels will commit transnational acts of terrorism
via MKV groups and not via other or MKC groups the attacks commit
transnational acts of terrorism committed by victims of mass killings who
join pre-existing MKC or other groups are not charted at being a result of the
mass killing. This may overemphasize the discrepancy
between terrorist groups that have been victims of mass killings
and other terrorist groups. For the qualitative study of my thesis, I conducted
a historical case study on the relationship between the Bosnian
genocide and Al-Qaeda, finding that Al-Qaeda, during and after the Bosnian
genocide had not only set up fundraising operations, training bases, research
centers, and passport distribution operations within the region,
but that this had also had a notable effect on the victims of mass killings
of the Bosnian genocide. Perhaps qualitative analysis explains why there
was a spike in the number of transnational attacks produced by this
country after the mass killing had occurred and perhaps it also explains why at
least two of the 19 9/11 suicide hijackers fought in Bosnia in 1995. In conclusion
my study proves that mass killings free transnational terrorism not yet
terrorist groups that have been victims of mass killings but perhaps via
pre-existing transnational terrorist groups that recruit victims of mass
killings because of this I suggest that future research focuses on the
recruitment mechanisms of pre-existing terrorist groups in regards to victims
of mass killings as well as their membership. In regards to counterterrorism efforts,
mass killings should no longer be disregarded it as a possible producer of
transnational terrorism, if the international community agrees to
implement the responsibility to protect principle, the lives of millions of
persecuted people’s around the world and the possible innocent victims of their
future terrorist attacks could be prevented. Thank you so much for
listening and I hope you enjoyed hearing a bit more about my research over the
past year. Good morning everyone, thanks so much for being here today
my name is Floyd and this morning I’m gonna talk about my honors thesis: Ethno-religious diversity and recovery after conflict in post ISIL Iraq at geospacial french. This is the country of Iraq, and from 2014 to 2017, the entire
green shaded area of this country was taken over by the Islamic state in Iraq
in the Levant an extremist Sunni Islamic terrorist organization.
This conflict displaced 3.2 million people, Iraq estimates it’s going to need
80 billion U.S. dollars to rebuild, but we know quick recovery is essential, both
because it allows people to put their lives back together and because the academic
literature tells us that post conflict countries countries need to recover quickly in
order to avoid renewed conflict and prolonged poverty. The international
community clearly recognizes this urgency, they spent six point four
billion dollars since 2014 trying to stabilize Iraq, but despite this obvious
need and the immense effort, here’s the puzzle, so here’s Sinjar and Tal Afar,
two settlements that were occupied by the Islamic state in the summer of 2014
they’re both located in the northwest corner in Iraq, in the fact they’re just a
45-minute drive away from each other, in many ways these settlements are similar
to each other, but they had wildly different
post-conflict experiences. One year after Tal Afar was liberated people were
returning home the markets were bustling and things were on the up-hand, but forty five
minutes down the road, in Sinjar, almost three years after that town was liberated,
reconstruction haven’t even started so this story she gets you thinking, why
might two places that are in some ways very similar recovers so differently
after conflict? This small puzzle led me to my bigger puzzle why do some places
rebuild faster than others after conflict there are, of course, a number of
different explanations for this but in my thesis I think is on one core
hypothesis that higher levels of ethnic and religious diversity cause places to
rebuild slower and I think that there might be the greatest trust loss
between residents in diverse areas and that more diverse divisive post
conflict control situations arise in them, I think that this low trust and
high competition might slow recovery. My thesis has a number of parts, but today
I’m going to focus primarily on my causal strategy and empirical results. At
points in this presentation, I’m going to hand way or suggest to you other parts
of my presentation thesis, but I’m not going to go into them in depth. With that
said, there are three major things that I want to accomplish today, first I want to
talk about how I built my key independent variable, second
I want to talk to you about my causal strategy and empirical results. I used
two different causal strategies, first I used a regression approach to try and
understand the overall landscape of influences on recovery, second I used to
synthetic control to try and look at the role of epic and religious diversity
specifically. So I’ll show you those strategies and their results in turn, and
then finally I’ll talk very briefly about why I think these things are happening.
So starting with the variable of construction the key independent record
of dependent or independent variable in my studies is ethnic and religious
diversity we needed a way to measure this and so I obtained settlement level
survey data on ethnic and religious composition of 350 Iraqi settlements
they were occupied by the Islamic state from the International Organization on
migration. I use this to build a measure of ethnic and
religious diversity. This is a map of the ISIL occupied portion of Iraq, the
dots in the foreground represent all of the villages in my sample and I’ve
colored them according to diversity so my measure is coding the darker places
as more diverse. The key dependent variable in this study is recovery but
deciding what recovery after conflict means and how to measure it is kind of a
tricky question. One of the common approaches in the literature and the one
that I decided to use is measure what fraction of pre-conflict GDP is
recovered by a certain fixed time period after conflict, I choose one year. But
now we have a problem because nobody is measuring the GDP of tiny Iraqi homeless
in the middle of a conflict zone at a monthly basis so how do we measure
post conflict recovery at a cellular level? My idea is to use satellite observe
nighttime light emissions as a proxy for economic activity. The theory here is an
economic process often emit light at night think about cars
driving on streets, think about providing household appliances, think with the
operation of factories or markets like the one you see on the left here is Tal
Afar. All of these things are economic processes, they all emit light at night
it turns out there’s an emerging economics literature that compares
luminosity data to gross domestic product where we know Gdp and the
correlation between these two measures is usually between 70 and 90 percent. So
changes in nighttime light are also clearly visible in Iraqi cities during
Islamic state occupation this graphic is showing you the nighttime lights of Mosul you can see that they go up during the three years at the Islamic state
occupied Mosul, afterwards, they were dark. So I
retained about seven years worth of monthly satellite data and I used it to
plot the destruction and recovery trends of all of my three hundred and fifty
settlements in nighttime light here are the two villages from the beginning of the story,
Tal Afar and Sinjar, you can see that although they have very similar pre
conflict and conflict trends, in the post conflict period it looks like Tal Afar
takes off and Sinjar stays dark for a long time. It turns out that there is
huge variation in post-conflict recovery across many settlements. Now the question
is to try and figure out whether ethnic and religious diversity can help us
explain this. This plot shows you the simple bivariate relationship between
increasing diversity on the x-axis and more recovery on the y-axis it’s clear
that there’s a negative relationship between these things, more diverse places
are associated with slower recovery but diverse places are different from
homogeneous places systematically in a whole bunch of ways other than the fact
that they aren’t diverse. So so far we can’t say anything about whether
diversity is causing the slower recovery, for that we need causal strategies. So I
mentioned there were two possible approaches are used in this thesis and
the first was a regression approach where I tried to understand the overall
picture of what influences recovery, if diversity matters at all and if it does
how big this effect size is compared to the effects of other influences on
recovery so I used a spatial auto regression model, it’s a special type of
regression model that controls for spatial influences. My key dependent
variable is the log fraction of pre-invasion light that is recovered by
December 2018 my key independent variable is the ethnic and religious
diversity score. But I also added four groups of controls so these are other
things that we think might influence recovery that I try and hold constant so
that I can evaluate the effect of diversity on recoveries specifically. So
first I controlled for some logistical factors that influence the ease of
reconstruction, second I controlled from some aspects of the experience of
conflict, third I held constant some pre-invasion population and demographic
characteristics, including, crucially, the majority ethnic and religious group in
each settlement, finally we know that the speed of recovery in one village might
have spillover benefits to nearby villages, so that’s why I chose this
spatial auto regression model and it does some work to try and hold this
local spillover effect constant so I’ve written the regression and then I
did some work to figure out what proportion of the total variation in
recovery can be explained by the different predictors in my model this is
the result of that test. So you can see that the model can directly assign
responsibility for about 40% of the total variation in post-conflict
recovery, but I didn’t have time to investigate all of these different
variables, so instead I decided to focus on just ethnic and religious diversity
and specifically. You can see that this variable explains about 9% of the total
variation in post-conflict reconstruction, it’s negative and
significant in the model. So the rest of my
thesis is about this slice of the pie. I wanted to investigate this effect
further to understand how big it is and understand whether it varies over time,
to do this, I used the second causal strategy called a generalized synthetic
control. So, this is the idea of Yu King Shu at the University of California San
Diego, and the idea here is that for each diverse settlement in my sample we
estimate how it would have performed in the post-conflict period if it was
instead homogenous but otherwise identical. The core intuition here is
that we are using the post-conflict performance of homogeneous settlements
that performed similarly to the diverse settlement before invasion to predict
how that diverse place would have done after conflict if it was instead
homogeneous, here’s the result of that test: the x-axis here shows you
the months relative to liberation, the vertical bar is Liberation Day, and y-axis
is the length level. The black line here is how diverse settlements actually did
on average after liberation and the blue dotted line is where this model
estimates they would have performed if they were instead homogeneous but
otherwise identical. We can learn three things from this test first
it suggests that diversity is perhaps causing places to rebuild slower, there
is almost no difference between diverse settlements and their synthetic
homogeneous controls before liberation, but after liberation, there’s a big one.
Second, it looks like the size of this penalty increases over time. And third, we
can tell you how big it is so we can tell you I’m logging these estimates
that after the first year of liberation higher diversity looks like it could be
responsible for about a 42 percent decline in economic activity in diverse places
by 16 months, this is 56 percent slowdown and by the end of the second year if you
took a diverse place and you made it homogeneous but left everything else the
same this model suggests that the level of economic activity in that village would double.
So, I conclude by giving you the very brief summary of the two things that I
think drive this effect, but I’m not going to go into detail on them quite yet. First I think there’s the greatest trust lost amongst Iraqis
living in diverse areas, some people sympathize with ISIL while their
neighbors were killed, it’s hardest to work together to rebuild with these
other people when the people you’re supposed to be working with are their
neighbors who you used to trust and then betrayed you. I was able to test this
using survey data on reported trust, it turns out that the median settlement in
the post conflict period reports that there’s some form of trust
problems amongst their village is, on average, half a standard deviation more
diverse on my measure than places that don’r report this. Second, I think there’s
something to do with the strategic choices of local elites here, today in Iraq
there are many different militant groups contesting control of different areas
and we look at the places where control is contested between multiple groups, it’s
overwhelmingly in places that are diverse. I don’t think this is a
coincidence. To keep it short, I think that there are
characteristics of diverse places that make them attractive. So, in conclusion,
this thesis has suggested some evidence that ethnic and religious diversity
might cause places to rebuild slower after conflict it has implications for
practitioners, for example the U.S. has recently decided to target
specifically it groups like Yezidis and Christians which overwhelmingly
live in diverse areas [inaudible] that diversity could be a
problem, and second, I think it has implications for academics broadly. I’m
very thankful to many people for this thesis, but most of all Professor Furen a
fantastic pieces advisor Professor Gould and IR honors cohort for everything
they’ve done and broadly I hope that this work and other work like it can
help us understand how to turn the lights back on
in places that need them.

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